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BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME?
ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND VIRTUES. James E. Fleming 1 and Linda C.
McClain. 2 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
2013. Pp. 371. $49.95 (Cloth).
Ken I. Kersch'

"Can liberalism still tell powerful stories?" asked the
intellectual historian and political theorist Eldon Eisenach in a
4
recent essay. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the progenitors of the contemporary American
liberal/left- Populists, proponents of the Social Gospel, and
Progressives-met and beat the era's powerful legal and political
conservatism with appeals to justice, equality, and a "new"
freedom, not as abstract concepts, but made through telling
stir~ing stori~s about the country's ?i~toric~l traJectory. as a
nation, and Its progress toward Chnstlan virtue.· The hberal
Democratic triumph and establishment of a governing regime,
however, coincided with the subsequent outbreak of the Second
World War and then the Cold War. Both called into sharp
question some of the main lines of the Populist and Progressive
Era's proto-liberalism, including its breast-beating nationalism,
its attraction to mass democracy, and, in domestic politics, its
aggressively theological us-versus-them substantive commitments. Liberals, now in control of all branches of the national
government (and most of the state governments), had no
intention of retreating from any of their substantive policy

1. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Associate
Dean for Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
2. Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law.
3. Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston College.
4. Eldon J. Eisenach, Can Liberalism Still Tell Powerful Stories?, 11 THE
EUROPEAN LEGACY: TOWARD NEW PARADIGMS 47 (2006).
5. See, e.g., HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909);
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM (1910); WOODROW WILSON, THE
NEW FREEDOM (1913).
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commitments. But many started talking about those commitments~ and justifying them, in new ways they believed to be
better suited to the ambient intellectual and political context. In
an age of liberal dominance, the commitment to the science of
society and value neutrality became the new gold-standard in the
6
thought and rhetoric of politics, public policy~ and law.
In his account of these developments, Eisenach argued that
the decision of mid-twentieth century American liberals to make
a commitment to neutral principles the cornerstone of their
understanding of liberal democracy had three major effects.
First, it gave preference in political and legal discourse to
apodictic claims of individual right~ as against an alternative
understanding that the nature and scope of rights was to be
determined politically, with the end of achieving common public
purposes. This preference, in turn, underwrote the notion that
courts were the polity's preeminent~ and only reliable, "forum of
principle." This served to redirect progressive/liberal reform out
away from electoral politics and into the courts to an historically
unprecedented degree. Second, it moved liberals away from the
kinds of nationalist and patriotic visions referencing a common
past and dreaming of a common, and better, future into legalistic
and quasi-philosophical arguments about neutral principles of
justice and fairness, to be applied by appropriately schooled
judges. Third, these developments created a "narrative vacuum"
which~ should they seize the opportunity, the conservative
opposition could fill anew with their own nationalist, religious,
and patriotic visions-which, by the 1970s, conservatives have
done. American liberalism has been on the defensive ever since.
It is precisely as this night fell on liberal dominance in
American politics that two resplendent Owls of Minerva took
flight: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice ~1971) and Ronald
Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977). While armies of
brainy Rawlsian political theorists and Dworkinian jurisprudes
moved towards consolidating their Ivory Tower empires,
conservatives reconstructed American politics, public policy, and
constitutional thought. These two sophisticated, subtle, and
6. Eisenach, supra note 4, at 60; see also DA YID A. HOLLINGER, SCIENCE, JEWS,
AND SECULAR CULTURE: STUDIES IN MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1996); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE
(1973); Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for
Studying Cross-National Influence Through Negative Models, 1 I-CON 296 (2003).
7. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977): JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE ( 1971).
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soporific tomes certainly kindled enthusiasm amongst careerists
in the groves of academe. But their all-but-storyless, a-political,
ostensibly neutral, and maddeningly abstracted exposition left
others cold. As liberalism's substitution of philosophical for
narrative coherence, Eisenach concluded, "came liberalism's loss
of the capacity to mobilize national majorities for common
ends."~ While Rawls and Dworkin may not be fully responsible
for this these developments, they contributed to it in a major
way, and epitomized it.
James Fleming and Linda McClain's new contribution to
American constitutional theory, Ordered Liberty: Rights,
Responsibilities, and Virtues bears all the marks of the
Rawlsian/Dworkinian project: the Harvard imprint, the title
pitched at a stratospheric level of abstraction (with its attendant
promise to unite us all through consensus over the best and
highest principles), and the presentation in the voice of the royal
"we" (which makes it sound like Ronald Dworkin speaking ex
cathedra, but here can be attributed to the book's provenance as
a team effort). Ordered Liberty is meant to be a major
intellectual event, announcing a new direction for Rawlsian/
Dworkinian constitutional thought. "Our constitutional
liberalism" (for which the authors frequently substitute the term
"constitutional liberalism" tout court) proposes an intricately
negotiated Pax Acadernia between liberal constitutional
theorists typically held to be uncompromising champions of
autonomy and rights as aggressively enforced by courts and civic
republican, communitarian, and conservative political theorists
and legalists (like Michael Sandel, Mary Ann Glendon, Cass
Sunstein, and others) who insist that politics and law be less
about the judicial enforcement of (speculative/broadly defined)
abstract right in the name of the autonomous individual and
more about the valuing of the claims of concrete, locally and
historically-constituted associations and communities, with a
focus on responsibility, morality, and virtue. Put otherwise, they
propose through an act of grand theoretical synthesis, to bring
the liberal-communitarian debate to a close.
Amongst American historians, that debate, under the guise
of liberalism versus republicanism, was brought (more or less) to
a close some time ago. Not so, apparently in political and legal
theory, where, while it still might be for this world, is
nevertheless, by now, getting quite long in the tooth. One fears
8.

Eisenach, supra note 4, at 60.
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that, in the realm of political theory, its terms might be
perpetual, as the debate goes to the heart of what Duncan
Kennedy has called the "fundamental contradiction" of
liberalism- that "relations with others are both necessary and
incompatible with our freedom." This is the dilemma of
9
individual versus collective self-determination. Yet, historically,
even in the realm of theory, it seems that a modus vivendi has
been arrived at, at least within American constitutional law. As
Fleming and McClain themselves explicitly and systematically
demonstrate, a liberal-communitarian rapprochement is, and has
long since, been practiced both on the Supreme Court (and,
perhaps more importantly for mankind, in his most recent work,
by the late Ronald Dworkin himself). Yet another Owl, it seems,
has taken flight.
Since both the Supreme Court and Ronald Dworkin have
been speaking prose all along, Ordered Liberty appears to be
aimed primarily at the understandings of conten:tporary liberal
constitutional theory by communitarian scholars (who have yet
to notice these on-the-ground developments), and by conservatives (who have a vested interest in insisting, as against all
evidence, that all (selfish) liberals care about are the vindication
of their individual constitutional rights- morals and the broader
public good be damned). Ordered Liberty at the very least brings
these people up-to-date, and shows them up, which is no small
service, and contribution.
Who are these liberals, Fleming and McClain ask, who care
nothing for the common good, and only for autonomy, who
spurn liberty for the pleasures of license? Wilth the single
exception of Roe v. Wade (1973) (which was reversed in relevant
part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)), the authors argue,
a hell-bent liberalism committed to pure autonomy has never
guided the Supreme Court in its major decisions involving
individual liberty (or Ronald Dworkin in his cogitations ). 10 Both
sides in the liberal-communitarian debate had and have valid
points, which have long-since been synthesized (viz. liberty
matters, and so does community). If a problem retnains, it is not
9. See Howard Gillman, The Antinomy of Public Purposes and Private Rights in
the American Constitutional Tradition, or Why Communitarianism is Not Necessarily
Exogenous to Liberal Constitutionalism, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 67 (1996) (citing Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1737 (1976)); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 205,210-13 (1979).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of SE Pa. v. Casey, 505
u.s 833 (1992).
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with liberals-they have met communitarians half-way-but
with the communitarians themselves (particularly the liberal
Democratic ones), many of whom refuse to stand up and say
when they are willing to recognize critical constitutional rights.
In advocating their new framework, Fleming and McClain
recur to the work of political theorists Stephen Macedo and
William Gals ton, who- in books with titles all but indistinguishable fron1 Fleming and McClain's-have been working
to integrate considerations of virtue into the liberal political
framework for over two decades. 11 Even Ronald Dworkin, we
are told, hardly precluded consideration of the common good
from his arguments, even for rights as trumps (the metaphor
implies, Fleming and McClain say, that there are other cards on
the table). Through what they describe as a "synthesis of
liberalism, civic republicanism, and feminism" extending the
arguments of Dworkin, Fleming and McClain propose what they
hold to be "the most defensible ordering of rights,
responsibilities, and virtues in the American constitutional
order" (p. 3).
Central to their framework is the proposal of a "formative
project for constitutional liberalism" (p. 115). By this purported
"third way," government would act to cultivate and encourage
responsible decisionmaking by rights-bearing individuals. Rather
than being relativistic, agnostic, or non-judgmental about the
substantive choices individuals make, Fleming and McClain's
constitutional liberalism would defer to those choices out of
(substantive) respect. In the authors' model, government would
concern itself with the formation of reflective, responsible
individuals who act in a way that is worthy of respect-with
forging the conditions for the responsible exercise of a
deliberative autonomy (or liberal virtue). The authors'
framework rests on a distinction they draw between two types of
responsibility: responsibility as accountability (to community)
versus responsibility as autonomy (or self-government). With the
former, the actor is "answerable to others for the manner and
consequences of exercising one's rights." With the latter, he or
she is trusted "to exercise moral responsibility in making
decisions guided by conscience and deliberation." In this way,
"constitutional liberalism aspires to secure the preconditions for
11. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CiTIZENSHIP, VIRTUES, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).
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ordered liberty, not liberty without responsibilities"; it does not
countenance indifference to matters of the collective public good
(pp. 6-7).
All this is sensible enough. But, as always, when dealing
with the characteristic abstractions of this literature, I'm never
quite sure what is at stake-or how. Since when has the
government evinced no concern for how people exercised their
rights, or, in a broad sense, have such concerns been rendered
off-limits? And since when has a commitment to "dignity,"
"autonomy," "equal concern and respect," or "the comtnon
good" ever decided a concrete case as a logical deduction from
principle? To those who intuitively share Fletning and McClain's
feelings about what dignity and respect require, their deductions
from principle (like those of Rawls and Dworkin) will seem
ineluctable. To others, they are non sequiturs.
The issue is raised in the book's very title, with its proud
12
commitment to "ordered liberty. " This phrase itself is worth
pausing over. It might be abstract, but it is hardly without
content. There is certainly such a thing as liberty without order,
which is either anarchy or license (though some would dispute
the application of the word "liberty" to such a state). One can
also imagine a ''disordered liberty'' -perhaps a liberty with some
kind of order, but one that is either random or erratic in its
protections, or out of harmony with any appropriate conception
of the good. Order without liberty would to most of us connote
tyranny. And disorder without liberty is a tooth-and-claw
Hobbesian state of nature. "Ordered liberty" --liberty under
law- is thus a useful, and real, concept. That said, though, within
free societies, it is a consensus commitment. 13 When applied to
describe an intricately theorized and specified constitutional
theory like Fleming and McClain's, or to resolve almost any
concrete, hotly-dispute case in the U.S. Suprerne Court, how
much work can the concept actually do?
This is illustrated by the most prominent uses of the phrase
in twentieth century American law and politics. Law professors
will immediately recognize it as Justice Cardozo's from his
celebrated double-jeopardy opinion in Palko v. Connecticut
14
(1937). Students of American political thought, however, will
12. Or what John Rawls. with his characteristic brio, called ··a well-ordered
society." RAWLS, supm note 7. at 453.
13. Ordered Liherty's apt epigraph is Locke's famous statement in his Second
Treatise on Civil Government that "where there is no law, there is no freedom .. ,
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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recognize it the phase used earlier by the President who
appointed Cardozo to the High Court, Herbert Hoover, in an
equally well-known 1928 campaign speech on "Rugged
Individualism." Like Fleming, McClain, and Cardozo. Hoover
counted himself a staunch proponent of "ordered liberty"while denouncing government interference with business,
socialism, paternalism, and bureaucracy (is this what John Rawls
calls an "overlapping consensus"?).'-' But, then again, for all
practical purposes, so what? Herbert Hoover's America and
Fleming and McClain's America would be very different places.
And those differences might very well track those that divide
liberals from conservatives in contemporary (constitutional)
politics. These are two very different "ordered liberties."
Between the idea and the reality falls the shadow.
In their demonstration that we all now share a commitment
to the Court's role in securing "ordered liberty," Fleming and
McClain, in a chapter entitled "The Myth of Strict Scrutiny for
Fundamental Rights," survey recent landmark Supren1e Court
decisions involving claims of (substantive) due process liberty.
They find that, in fact, the (mid-to-late twentieth century liberal,
activist) Court has always related claims of autonomy to the
well-being of the collective interests of society. This raises two
questions: First, is it true? Second, if it is true, so what?
Is it true? As legal scholars, Fleming and McClain apply
their Rawlsian abstractions to concrete cases. In doing so, the
authors devote most of their attention to two kinds of cases. The
first involve questions of family and parental rights (especially
those involving the counterclaims of religion and the state-such
as those well-worn toys in the Rawlsian sandbox, Wisconsin v.
Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins)."' The second involve the Court's
(substantive) due process liberty decisions involving bodily
(mostly sexual and reproductive) autonomy. Given these preoccupations, the case of gay rights-and of gay families in

15. Specifically, Hoover (who elsewhere proclaimed himself ''an unashamed
individualist") said that "By adherence to the principles of decentralized selfgovernment, ordered liberty. equal opportunity. and freedom to the individual, our
American experiment in human welfare has yielded a degree of well-being unparalleled
in the world. It has come nearer to the abolition of poverty. to the abolition of fear of
want, than humanity has ever reached before ... Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism,
in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A NORTON ANTHOLOGY 1140 (Isaac Kramnick
and Theodore J. Lowi eds., 2009). See JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005);
RAWLS, supra note 7.
16. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
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particular-represents something of a perfect storm (despite its
abstracted title, much of Ordered Liberty is devoted to discussing
gay rights).
The book's very substantive timeliness in this regard,
however, can distract us from questions of selection bias. As for
the first type of case, where schools and families are front and
center, it is not hard, should it be deemed rhetorically helpful, to
17
rustle up a claim for community that yields the same "liberal"
result coughed up pursuant to an argument from autonomy. As
for the second, although sounding doctrinally in questions of
liberty, they are clearly (also) cases involving group or caste
equality (women, gays and lesbians). These types of cases are
thus ripe for re-description as implicating serious questions of
the public good, responsibility, citizenship, and virtue. The
problem is that these two types of cases are only a small part of
"rights revolution" cases that conservatives and communitarians
criticize for being overly solicitous of claims anchored in
arguments about autonomy. Where, I wondered, was the
discussion of the claims of autonomy in cases involving, say, a
jacket that says "Fuck the Draft," flag-burning, nude-dancing,
the possession of pornographic films, cross-burning, hateful
disruptive protests at military funerals, the banning of violent
video games, the aggressive defense of criminal process rights,
including aggressive assertions of the Fifth Amendment in cases
involving charges of domestic subversion, etc. ? 1s -How do these
types of cases fit into Fleming and McClain's framework
emphasizing the creation of the conditions of "deliberative
autonomy"? Right-wing communitarians like Mary Ann
Glendon and Sarnuel Ali to are more than happy to take on these
issues. They argue that in these areas there is too nauch attention
to rights, and not enough to the claims o:f community.
Liberal/Left communitarians (and liberal liberals ostensibly
moving to meet them halfway, like Fleming and McClain),
however, are quite skittish about lingering over those types of
issues. Why? Because, I would venture, in these cases, while one
can certainly theorize one's way to the conclusion that it is in the
community's best interest to afford constitutional protection to

17. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
18. Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010); Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560
(1991 ); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Viii. of
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969); Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Nazis taunting Auschwitz survivors or Klansmen parading and
burning crosses, in these sorts of cases, claims of autonomy do
the lion's share of the work to guide the Court to a (politically)
liberal result in a (politically) plausible way. 19 The selection bias
in Ordered Liberty (and similar scholarly endeavors)
systematically draws attention away from the areas of civil
liberties law where arguments about creating the conditions for
responsible deliberative autonomy and full citizenship for
unjustly oppressed (but, it is implied, morally noble) groups is
likely to run up hardest against liberal (that is, contemporary
Democratic Party) political commitments. The types of civil
liberties cases that Ordered Liberty sidesteps do not (in any
immediate way) involve the sort of cognitive formation that is at
the heart of Fleming and McClain's foundational concept of
"deliberative autonomy" (in the way that schools cases like
Wisconsin v. Yoder- the case that has launched a thousand
Rawlsian ships-does). Fleming and McClain's model for the
reconciliation of liberty and community in due process liberty
cases, moreover, does not work as well when despised groups are
involved, so the authors are pretty much silent on cases involving
them (that is why we have an ACLU). Indeed, their framework,
as a matter of history, does not work very well for the same
groups they do discuss, so long as those groups remain broadly
despised or devalued by society (yet another indication that this
book is most decidedly a strategic bid to sell liberalism in a
conservative era). Fleming and McClain's constitutional
liberalism can play its part effectively only at a very particular
and identifiable time in constitutional development. In areas like
women's reproductive liberty and gay rights, strong autonomy
claims- made without reference to the common good- are no
longer needed today. But they were either needed, or inevitable,
in earlier stages of the fight for civil rights and liberties, when
members of despised and oppressed out-groups worked up the
courage to first claim their rights. In the U.S., rights-talk has
been rallying talk: always has been, always will be. It is certainly
a critical part of American culture, nationalism, and patriotism20
that is, of American stories, right and left. The initial demand
19. This is not to say that even extreme defenses of individual autonomy in free
speech cases could not be theoretically justified in public good terms. Free speech theory
has no problem claiming that affording maximum autonomy to speech advances the
public good. The problem then collapses, of course. While they are nice in theory, these
theories have a hard time flying politically, since they involve a relatively abstract and
sophisticated constitutional theodicy.
20. I consider Mary Ann Glendon a European, not an American thinker.
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for individual freedom (self-determination) through aggressive,
non-relational, rights-talk is often critical for forging the identity,
the self-conception-the pride-of members of social
movements daring to act publicly as agents to assert their rights.
While such defiant, assertive claims of entitlernent to one's
individual rights may seem, as a matter of political theory, like a
claim to pure autonomy, individuals who make such claims are,
paradoxically, in so doing, enrolling themselves in the scrolls of
the collective American national story. The United States is the
country in which the individual, through the proud assertion of
his autonomy, is dissolved into something complete and great.
This is, indeed, "the pursuit of happiness."
To be sure, it becomes easier over time, as a matter of
psychology and then of political rhetoric and theory, for the
shock troops of social movements demanding full citizenship and
equality to focus on their commonalities with others, and the
ways in which their freedom harmonizes with the freedom of all.
Once a minimal level of autonomy is claimed and found- once
enough autonomy is gained so that members of oppressed
groups can stand on their own feet as self-determining agentswe are ripe for arguments that their freedoms are consonant
21
with the broader public good. In this temporal, developmental
trajectory, the fabrication of a liberal constitutional theory
reconciling individual liberty with the claims of co1mmunity is the
last stage in the process, a mopping-up operation . It is a bid for
the institutionalization of movement politics through its
absorption into law, which, in the end is only as stable as it is
understood to advance the collective public good (salus populi
suprema lex est). In this regard, we should understand Fleming
and McClain's hook as a bid, after long hard struggle, to bring it
all back ho1ne.
As Dworkinians, Fleming, and McClain's road home, of
course, runs through the reasoning of federal judges, who are to
properly apply the authors' proposed "perfectionist" theory to
concrete constitutional cases. Interestingly, and notably, their
hero here is not William 0. Douglas or even William J. Brennan
(that is for those pony-tailed, old-school ACLU types) but the
second Justice John Marshall Harlan. Harlan's approach to
21. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LFGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Reva B.
Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution .from a Social Movement Perspective,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
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deciding civil liberties cases was distinctive in its refusal to follow
the modern frameworks of analysis for those cases developed
during the New Deal ascendency.
In Ordered Liberty, Fleming and McClain do not recount
this history- which means that they don't set the context for the
uses to which Cardozo put the concept of "ordered liherty" in
his famous Palko opinion. There, Cardozo used it to distinguish
between cases implicating those provisions of the Bill of Rights
which are fundamental ("i1nplicit in the concept of ordered
liberty") and thus slated for application to the states by through
"absorption" (what we call "incorporation") via the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and those which are not.
Cardozo's use of the concept represented an early and critical
step in what later became known as the "Preferred Freedoms"
doctrine- the notion that some rights are so fundamental that
they would be aggressively enforced at the national level by
courts as a matter of constitutional law (rights). This marked a
clear departure from the traditional, highly deferential
nineteenth century "bad tendency" framework for rights
enforcement, in which state determinations of the advancement
of the common good, through the exercise of their police powers
and other residual powers (see the Tenth Amendment) were left
22
more or less untouched by the federal judiciary (community).
There was mutual adjustment of the claims of right and claims of
community under this regime, too. But the claims of community
23
were plainly weighted much more heavily.
In their chapter on "The Myth of Strict Scrutiny for
Fundamental Rights," Fleming and McClain pooh-pooh the
tiers-of-scrutiny framework that was a direct outgrowth of, and
the doctrinal embodiment of, the preferred freedoms approach
to fundamental rights. That framework ostensibly placed fundamental rights claims on a plane all but impervious to regulation
24
(Gerald Gunther's "strict in theory, fatal in fact"). But, Fleming
and McClain argue, after surveying the Court's (recent)
substantive due process liberty decisions, in spite of this
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
See LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW (1957); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The
Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties
Jurisprudence, 47 POLITICAL RES. Q. 623 (1994).
24. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
22.
23.
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architecture, the Court has not been following it: like Justice
Harlan, who never subscribed to this framework, it has been
weighing rights against the collective good all along.
If you have kept your eye on the ball that Fleming and
McClain are pitching you might not pause to reflect that,
historically and theoretically the tiers framework was closely
related not only to the question of uncabined judicial discretion
(not a big concern for Dworkinians, but a very big concern to
25
Progressives and New Dealers like Hugo Black), but also to the
question of whether the Bill of Rights was applicable to the
states. In spurning one, we undercut the theoretical foundations
of the other, since that framework too (as Palko suggests) was
anchored in the understanding of some rights, as a matter of
constitutional architecture, as being fundamental or "'preferred."
This was quite clear to Justice Harlan, who famously insistedthough Fleming and McClain never mention it-that the federal
courts give the states significantly more leeway in interpreting
the Bill of Rights than they would afford the federal government. Although he certainly was willing to come down on the
side of rights in individual circumstances (he has lots of streeterect amongst contemporary liberals for his friendliness to
privacy rights claims in the contraception case of Poe v.
2
Ullman ), (, Harlan was big on deference to the community,
speaking through its elected representatives in Congress or the
states, even in cases involving rights. He eschewed bright-line
doctrinal rules, preferring (like his predecessor liberal/
conservative/rights-problematic predecessor Felix Frankfurter)
to judge the fundamentalness of rights for purposes of judicial
protection and incorporation on a case-by-case basis. As we
drain the tub of the tiers-of-scrutiny bathwater, we would do
well to keep a close eye on our babies.
Fleming and McClain heap special praise on Harlan for
rejecting and confounding dichotomies, for being "at once
progressive and conservative" (p. 197). They like his thoughtful
balancing. As for where the balancing point should be in an untiered framework that makes no institutional commitment to
stacking the deck in favor of judicial activism or restraint, or the
claims of right as against those of community, it remains far from
clear. The authors argue, of course, that, in the latter case, if

25. See MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER,
HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING ( 1984).
26.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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conceptualized properly, the two are one (and liberal Democrats
get all they want, constitutionally, to boot). But Fleming and
McClain's argument for precisely how this is so is based on their
analysis of a subset of constitutional cases whose selection is
both theoretically and historically skewed to support their thesis.
These cases do not effectively speak to the full universe of civil
liberties concerns.
Fleming and McClain's long-awaited reconciliation of the
claims of order, liberty, rights, responsibility, and virtue depends
upon the avoidance (or minimizing) of these cases and the
obfuscation (or elision) of this history. The book strains toward a
new liberalism that has once again gotten right with America. In
so doing, it is in perfect harmony with the moment-and, I am
afraid, the contemporary liberal predicament.

